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negotiations. As the article argues, transnational campaigning operates within a nexus of multiple, and sometimes con-
flicting, geographic frames. In both campaigns discussed here, activists typically engaged with the wider public via the
national context and, sometimes, with allusions to ‘national autonomy.’ However, their activism was dependent upon a
frame espousing ‘transnational solidarity.’ Developed over time, this structured their transnational relations with other
groups and more full-time activists.
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1. Introduction
Geography is at the centre of trade policy. It defines
trade flows. It structures the regulatory environment
in which goods and services are sold and investments
made. It is most evident in the ‘open versus closed’ di-
chotomy through which trade policy is currently viewed.
The TrumpPresidency in theUS is often depicted asmark-
ing a sharp return to amore openly protectionist rhetoric
along nationalist lines, evoking isolationism. Both sides
debating the Brexit impasse have also used explicitly ge-
ographic narratives: Advocates of Brexit have framed the
European Union (EU) as a barrier to the UK otherwise
accessing global markets, while critics have focused on
the need for continued ‘frictionless’ trade with the UK’s
closest neighbours. Trade policymore generally operates
in a political environment that involves multiple insti-
tutional levels, including the sub-national, national and
global (see Goff & Broschek, in press).
This article examines the use of geography as a
means to politicize two key moments in the recent his-
tory of EU trade policy: the World Trade Organization
(WTO) General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
negotiations of the early to mid-2000s, and the EU–US
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Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) ne-
gotiations, in the mid-2010s. The collapse of the TTIP ne-
gotiations, coming as it did in the context of the Brexit
referendum and the election of Donald Trump as US
President, might easily be viewed as yet another exam-
ple of a ‘nationalist backlash’ against political and eco-
nomic globalization. The TTIP campaign was, at some
points, supported by political groups on the far-right,
and even more left-wing activists utilized references to
the restriction of national autonomy to help politicize
TTIP as a ‘threat’ (e.g., Jones, 2014). Yet, to read politi-
cization around TTIP only in reference to these groups
and arguments misses the more variegated cleavages
underpinning the politicization of trade policymaking.
During both the earlier GATS talks and those focused
on TTIP, NGOs, which played a central role in politiciz-
ing the respective negotiations, utilized a variety of geo-
graphic frames that drew on notions of both ‘national au-
tonomy’ and ‘transnational solidarity.’ As a result, their
activities cannot be labelled simply as either ‘anti-’ or
‘pro-globalization.’
The article begins in Section 2 by clarifying what is
meant by ‘geographic frames,’ and how these drive politi-
cization by civil society actors. Section 2.1 then provides
a discussion of the methods and sources used in the sub-
sequent frame analysis. This is undertaken in Sections 3
and 4, which focus on two campaign devices utilized
across both periods. The first is transnational petitions,
in which campaign groups formulate a series of joint
demands which they or the public sign. The second is
‘municipal-level trade contestation,’ where civil society
actors work closely with local governments in support of
their critical demands (Siles-Brügge & Strange, in press).
As we discuss in the concluding Section 5, studying how
campaigners utilize a mix of geographic frames has im-
portant implications. They are not merely descriptive of
the activities and demands of civil society groups or mu-
tually exclusive. Rather, they reflect a desire to engage
with the public in a national context while also construct-
ing a transnational network of activists. This leads us to
rethink not only the politicization of trade policy, but also
how to interpret the political conditions that constrain or
favour trade negotiations, going beyond a simple picture
of nationalism versus globalism.
2. The Role of Geographic Frames in Politicization
Civil society activists have been identified as key drivers
of the politicization of EU trade policy over the past two
decades (for a review, see Meunier & Czesana, 2019).
They played a central role in bringing the GATS to pub-
lic attention and are credited with spurring some shifts
in the EU’s policy position in these negotiations (Strange,
2014, p. 158). Moreover, during the even more high-
profile TTIP talks, the key political cleavage to emerge
was not between different economic interest groups, as
conventional accounts of trade politics might have sug-
gested, but between transatlantic business alliances sup-
portive of the talks and NGOs that were broadly critical
(Young, 2016).
We argue that the social movement literature study-
ing such groups uses comparable theoretical building
blocks to the politicization literature. This latter litera-
ture has argued that three dimensions need to be in
play to be able to speak of politicization: an ‘expansion
of actors and audiences’ engaged with an issue; issue
‘salience’ (significance); and, the ‘polarisation of opinion’
(de Wilde, Leupold, & Schmidtke, 2016). The study of so-
cial movements, for its part, often adopts a ‘contentious
politics’ approach focused on examining the claimsmade
by civil society actors vis-à-vis governments. This is remi-
niscent of the notion of polarization, in this case between
the ‘maker’ (social movement/civil society actor) and ‘re-
ceiver’ (often, but not exclusively, a government actor)
of the claim (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, pp. 7–12).
Our more concrete focus here, however, is on relat-
ing the three dimensions of politicization to the strate-
gic use of ‘collective action frames’ discussed in social
movement scholarship. The collective action necessary
for a socialmovement ormore loosely organized transna-
tional advocacy network (TAN) to emerge—which must
be seen as a precondition of its ‘contentious claims-
making’—is dependent upon a common frame by which
individuals may understand their shared activity, attract
other individuals, and be represented to their target
(e.g., a national government; Benford & Snow, 2000).
Such frames may be used to delineate the terms of
polarization, defining in the eyes of activists who the
maker and receiver of claims are. Where groups wish
to increase the salience of a frame (and associated is-
sue), they might focus on its ‘centrality’ to the lives of
the intended target; its ‘experiential commensurability’
and its ‘cultural resonance,’ ‘or what Campbell (1988)
would call myths’ (Benford & Snow, 2000, pp. 619–622).
Finally, where activists wish to drive actor expansion, re-
cent scholarship on framing and ideas has emphasized
the role of ‘polysemic’ or ambiguous frames (or ideas)
as ‘coalition magnets,’ strategically deployed by ‘policy
entrepreneurs’ to bridge potentially disparate interests
(Béland & Cox, 2016). Multiple and ambiguousmeanings
are said to go hand-in-hand with higher levels of abstrac-
tion, where ideas or frames possess greater emotional
appeal ‘because they tap into a core level of personal and
group identity’ (Cox & Béland, 2013, p. 316).
Although drawing on some of its building blocks, our
approach does represent a key point of difference in re-
spect of the literature on politicization. This latter body
of work has often focused on how transfers of authority
from the state to ‘higher’ levels, such as supranational or-
ganizations,might trigger a backlash (e.g., deWilde et al.,
2016). We argue, in contrast, that civil society groups
do not just rely on emphasizing national sovereignty,
painting supranational institutions as the enemy. Their
collective action frames—and contentious politics more
broadly—do not always rest on establishing a polarizing
fault-line between political activity at the national and
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supranational levels. This is especially relevant where
civil society organizations act across national borders,
whether through sharing information, strategy, or engag-
ing in coordinated action.
Our argument is thus focused on how geography
often becomes salient as a way in which collective ac-
tion frames used by civil society groups to politicize and
contest policy are structured (Cumbers, Routledge, &
Nativel, 2008). Such ‘geographic frames’ may express
difference, by emphasizing the different national ori-
gins of activists (e.g., ‘Canadian,’ ‘Kenyan’) or ‘national
autonomy/sovereignty,’ in the latter case underscoring
the imposition of supranational rules on national gov-
ernments. But they may also be used to express com-
monalities between activists that transcend national bor-
ders, especially where theymight be considered abstract
(e.g., ‘Global,’ ‘Latin American,’ ‘European’). For exam-
ple, the emotional pull of a perceived community of
‘English-speaking peoples’ has motivated a, these days
influential, TAN in favour of closer economic association
between the UK and the Anglosphere and given legit-
imacy to the associated geographic frame prominently
adopted by the UK Government of a ‘Global Britain’ (Bell
&Vucetic, 2019; Daddow, 2019). This is in spite of the fact
that actors within this network marry such frames with
an emphasis on preserving UK ‘sovereignty’ (Rosamond,
2019, p. 415).
With multiple geographic frames sitting side-by-side,
activists can be highly strategic with how they use
them. In some cases, civil society organizations and TANs
may subvert traditional hierarchical orders in order to
place the ‘local’ alongside or above the ‘national’ or
even ‘global’ (Leitner, Sheppard, & Sziarto, 2008). By
challenging such orders, there is not a clear ranking
in which the ‘national’ has sole jurisdiction of the ‘lo-
cal,’ in which the latter can only access the ‘global’
via the former. Crucially, the binary between the ‘na-
tional/supranational’ is blurred where groups can uti-
lize frames emphasizing national autonomy and transna-
tional solidarity simultaneously to motivate support for
their cause. Rather than represent a contradiction, the
ambiguity and abstraction of these geographic frames al-
lows them to act as effective ‘coalition magnets,’ bring-
ing together a broader alliance of groups. In this vein, ge-
ographic frames should not be mistaken as a mere de-
scription of a ‘movement’ or its demands but rather as
part of a political process of self-representation (Strange,
2014; see also Smith, 2005). They should not simply be
taken at face value as they represent deliberate political
communication by civil society actors.
Bringing together potentially disparate groups is
especially significant when campaigning against trade
agreements. These both transcend national boundaries
and involve a multitude of different actors, who them-
selves often communicate with one another via a tech-
nical language premised on economic and legal exper-
tise (see Hannah, Scott, & Trommer, 2016). Civil society
activists wishing to politicize such agreements therefore
benefit from being able to operate across borders, but
also from speaking to a variety of different audiences, no-
tably translating the technical terminology and highlight-
ing its significance to potential supporters.
2.1. Research Questions, Methodology and Sources
Building on this framework, our article seeks to address
three specific questions:
1) How do geographic frames serve as coalition mag-
nets to link groups, such as those involved in forming
a TAN, across borders, leading to actor expansion?
2) How do geographic frames define polarization be-
tween themakers and receivers of contentious claims,
including across different geographic levels?
3) How do activists use geographic frames to draw out
the salience of a trade negotiation so that it is seen as
significant in the eyes of relevant actors?
In addressing these questions, the article will also be
closely examining the audiences to which different geo-
graphic frames are being addressed.
Framing is undertaken wherever activists articu-
late their common position and demands, and there-
fore includes both oral and written communication,
as well as potentially other devices. However, our
frame analysis in this article focuses on two spe-
cific instruments—transnational petitions and munic-
ipal level trade contestation—as prominent means
through which trade politicization manifested itself dur-
ing both the GATS and TTIP negotiations. In focusing
on these instruments, we are not suggesting that the
frames expressed here represented a unified civil soci-
ety position—or that there was not a political debate be-
tween groups over the choice of frame to use. But, given
limited space, we choose to focus on the frames as ar-
ticulated through these two instruments for three rea-
sons. Firstly, they involve the explicit and detailed state-
ment of civil society frames in a public setting. They are
also prima facie organized on different scales (transna-
tional petitions/meetings versus local government mo-
tion), allowing us to explorewhethermultiple geographic
frames are still used in each context. Finally, these instru-
ments were consistently used across both campaign pe-
riods (GATS and TTIP), with similar organizations, notably
members of the Seattle-to-Brussels (S2B) TAN (Gheyle,
2019, p. 183), playing a role—allowing for comparison
across time. In the remainder of this sub-section we pro-
vide an overview of the corpus of textual materials relat-
ing to these activities that we focus on in our analysis of
civil society frames (see also Tables 1 and 2).
Transnational petitions are utilized by civil society
to frame their network and its political demands, typi-
cally led by a small core of groups with most signato-
ries (either individuals or other groups) asked only to pro-
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vide their formal support (Strange, 2011). In turn, those
nationally-based groups often use the petitions to rep-
resent their work when communicating with their sup-
porters via online hyperlinks to the group hosting the
petition on their website. Transnational petitions have
taken two forms. During the GATS period, the focus
was on ‘global group petitions’ (GGPs), or ‘online peti-
tions typically framed as “global,” linking sometimes hun-
dreds of advocacy groups behind a common set of crit-
ical statements targeting an institution of global gover-
nance’ and seen as a key instrument of TANs (Strange,
2011, p. 1237). Therewere five such anti-GATSGGPs, run-
ning from December 1999 to June 2005 (for an overview,
see Table 1). TTIP campaigning took a different path to
the GATS activity, in part due to the creation of the
European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI). We see this as compa-
rable to a GGP in purpose and transnational reach, but
with its geographic scope more explicitly European. It
came into being in 2011 as an EU institutional innovation
to counter criticism of the EU’s supposed ‘democratic
deficit’: onemillion signatures to an ECI would oblige the
Commission to respond (Szeligowska &Mincheva, 2012).
The STOP TTIP ECI submitted for registration in July 2014
demanded that the Commission and EU Member States
cease the TTIP negotiations and that CETA not be rati-
fied (Efler et al., 2014). However, in September 2014, the
Commission rejected registration of the ECI (European
Commission, 2014). While this was not unusual, what
was significant was that the organizers of the STOP TTIP
ECI chose to create a ‘self-organized ECI’ (sECI), launch-
ing it only fifteen days later. Within a year, by early
October, organizers ‘handed over’ what they claimed
were 3,263,920 signatures from 23 Member States to
the European Commission (Zalan, 2015). The organiz-
ers also appealed the Commission’s decision to deny
the ECI registration, but the European Court of Justice’s
finding, overturning the decision, was only announced
in May 2017 (Case T-754/14)—after the TTIP negotia-
tions were already on hiatus and CETA ratified by the
European Parliament.
Municipal-level trade contestation, meanwhile, has
also taken two forms (see Siles-Brügge & Strange, in
press). The first has led activists to pressure municipali-
ties into passing motions that were critical of the GATS
and TTIP negotiations. Motions were generally based on
templates prepared by NGOs associated with the S2B
network, such as the Association for the Taxation of
Financial Transactions and for Citizens’ Action, known by
its French acronym ATTAC (see, e.g., GATSWatch, n.d.;
TTIP Free Zones, 2019b). Given space constraints, we
focus our analysis on the templates used by ATTAC in
Austria and France. These countries together accounted
for most motions passed in both periods. During the
GATS campaign, previous research has identified 744mo-
tions in France and 388 in Austria (against just under 400
elsewhere); the equivalent figures for the TTIP campaign
are 760 in France and 408 in Austria (against 846 else-
where; Siles-Brügge & Strange, in press). In the case of
France and the GATS period, we draw on the template
used by ATTAC-Rhône, which is similar to that used by
other local chapters (e.g., ATTAC 91, 2005).
Municipal activism also involved the organization
of a set of (transnational) meetings of NGOs and mu-
nicipalities that served as evidence of campaign coor-
dination. During the GATS period, the more France-
focused ‘States-General of local authorities against GATS’
(Bobigny, November 2004) morphed into a European
and, later, global ‘Convention for the Promotion of
Public Services,’ held respectively in Liège (October 2015)
and Geneva (October 2016; Convention Européenne des
Collectivités Locales, 2005, 2006; Crespy, 2016, p. 171).
During the TTIP period, there was even stronger evi-
dence of coordination of the various national municipal-
ity campaigns, which coalesced around the banner of
‘TTIP Free Zones Europe.’ Transnational meetings of mu-
nicipalities, with civil society participation as before (see,
e.g., Patterson, 2016), were organized in Barcelona (April
2016), Grenoble (February 2017), and Antwerp (March
2019)—although campaigning was already petering out
by the time the secondmeeting was held (Pan-European
meeting of local authorities, 2016; Pan-European meet-
ing of TTIP-free zones, 2017; Not Without Municipalities,
2019). The last meeting in Antwerp did not even issue a
statement on their website. Anti-TTIP campaigners ran a
single website mapping the extent of municipal engage-
ment and providing an overview of some of the national
templates that could be used by local activists (see TTIP
Free Zones, 2019a).
In the following sections we turn to analyzing the
frames contained within these campaign devices, illus-
trating how the groups involved have built solidarity
across time.
3. Solidarity in Transnational Petitions
In the case of the anti-GATS group petitions, there was
a combination of frames underscoring both national
autonomy—in the national categorization of signato-
ries and the emphasis on protecting governmental reg-
ulatory power—and global transnational solidarity (see
Table 1 for an overview of the geographic frames and
activist groups involved). The use of both ambiguous ge-
ographic frames enabled such petitions to serve a dou-
ble purpose of: a) acting as a coalition magnet, lead-
ing to actor expansion through the construction of a
transnational network; and b) underscoring the central-
ity of the issue to groups’ supporters in a national con-
text, raising the salience of the GATS. Moreover, while
in some cases the geographic frame set up an opposi-
tion between the policies adopted by supranational or
multinational entities (such as the WTO or multinational
corporations) and nation-states, petitions were also ad-
dressed from transnational activists to national govern-
ments. Polarization on this issue was thus not simply
along a national-supranational axis (‘we, national citi-
zens/organizations,must resist the imposition of GATS by
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Table 1. Geographic frames in transnational petitions.
Civil society groups involved Components of framing strategy and politicization
GATS campaign
• WTO—Shrink or Sink!
• (1999)
• Stop the GATS Attack
• Now! (2001)
• Nairobi Civil Society
• Declaration on the
• GATS (2003)
• Evian Challenge (2003)
• Stop the GATS power
• play against citizens of
• the world! (2005)
WTO—Shrink or Sink! (1999)
• ‘Our World Is Not For Sale’ network
• (429 signatories).
Stop the GATS Attack Now! (2001)
• Polaris Institute, European and
• North American groups (563
• signatories from 63 countries).
Nairobi Civil Society Declaration on
the GATS (2003)
• Polaris and European groups, but
• predominantly African organizations
• (25 signatories).
Evian Challenge (2003)
• 146 international signatories.
Stop the GATS power play against
citizens of the world! (2005)
• 148 international signatories.
Centrality (to increase salience)
National autonomy:
• GATS undermines government regulatory power;
• National categorization of signatories.
Polysemy (to drive actor expansion)
Global solidarity in the fight against corporate
power. At times a focus on solidarity with
developing countries and at others on those
affected by EU policies.
Defining the terms of polarization
Opposition not just between national and
supranational actors (e.g., WTO), but also between
transnational actors (activists) and nation-states
over the desirable form of globalization.
TTIP campaign
• (Self-organized)
• European Citizens’
• Initiative
• (2014-2015/2017)
‘Stop TTIP Alliance,’ closely linked to
Seattle-to-Brussels. Citizens’
committee included Michael Efler
(Mehr Demokratie), Susan George
(Transnational Institute) and John
Hilary (fromWar on Want).
Centrality, cultural resonance, and experiential
commensurability (to increase salience)
TTIP as a threat to European standards.
Polysemy (to drive actor expansion)
European solidarity as a means of sustaining
pan-European cooperation.
Defining the terms of polarization
Opposition between different types of European
actor and policy.
Sources: 11.11.11 et al. (2003), Action Aid Uganda et al. (2003), AFTINET (2001), ARENA (2005), Efler et al. (2014), Gheyle (2019), Third
World Network (1999).
supranational institutions’). Rather, it reflected the juxta-
position of an alternative form of globalization advanced
by NGOs alongside traditional nation-centric models of
political power also mobilized by these activists.
Anti-GATS mobilization emerged in the aftermath of
two apparent ‘success’ stories for campaign groups in-
volved in what has been referred to as the ‘global justice
movement’ (Della Porta, 2007): the collapse of theWTO’s
Third Ministerial Conference in Seattle in December
1999 and the stalling in 1998 of negotiations towards a
proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (Egan,
2001). A critical GATS demand entered the first GATS-
relevantGGP ‘WTO—Shrink or Sink!’ that activists groups
published in the immediate aftermath of the Seattle
protests (Third World Network, 1999). This framed GATS
as a threat to government regulatory protection of ‘the
environment, health, safety and other public interests’
(Third World Network, 1999). However, this petition and
those that followed reflected a broader balancing act be-
tween emphasizing transnational/global solidarity and
national sovereignty. Notably, ‘WTO—Shrink or Sink’ was
used at the same time as one of two founding declara-
tions of the ‘Our World Is Not For Sale’ network. This
was formed to facilitate many of the transnational civil
society alliances that developed in the build-up and dur-
ing the Seattle protests. The petition thus also sought to
link people across borders in transnational solidarity, not-
ing that ‘around the world in rich and poor nations alike,
millions of people…fight for a just and sustainable future
and against corporate globalization,’ whilst listing the sig-
natory groups by country. Governments were presented
as largely passive victims or, in the case of the more pow-
erful, as tools for a ‘corporate elite’ and the ‘WTO’s al-
legedly neutral Secretariat’ (ThirdWorld Network, 1999).
Similarly, the 2001 ‘Stop the GATS Attack Now!’ GGP,
promoted by North American and European groups, and
coordinated by the Canadian Polaris institute, contained
a mixture of geographic frames. It argued that the GATS
2000 negotiations ‘create vast new rights and access
for multinational service providers and newly constrain
government action taken in the public interest world-
wide’ (AFTINET, 2001). It targeted national governments,
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which were asked to ‘immediately invoke a moratorium
on the…negotiations’ and then follow seven overlapping
demands that included asserting governmental respon-
sibility over public services towards basic rights; prevent-
ing foreign governments and corporations from under-
mining public interest laws; and, including citizen or-
ganizations within government representation at global
trade and investment negotiations (AFTINET, 2001).
That said, some differences in the articulation of the
global solidarity frame could also be observed in the
GGPs. The 2003 ‘Nairobi’ petition—which came out of
a meeting in the Kenyan capital, organized by Polaris and
European groups with representatives of African civil so-
ciety from across the continent—specifically called upon
‘developing governments…to promote, protect and re-
claim the southern policy space, to review, with a view
to withdraw, current commitments and therefore not to
make any new commitments in current GATS negotia-
tions’ (Action Aid Uganda et al., 2003). Signatory groups
were identified by name and country, and the petition
was presented as a joint statement of transnational sol-
idarity amongst those signatories (Action Aid Uganda
et al., 2003). Similarly, the last petition critical of GATS
from 2005 (‘Stop the GATS power play against citizens
of the world!’) was intended to specifically critique the
inclusion of services within the then still-ongoing Doha
negotiations—since stalled—and problematized GATS as
a threat to developing countries. It also reiterated the ar-
guments developed in the earlier petitions that GATSwas
a device pushed by multinational service corporations
to undermine national regulatory space. It targeted the
heads of Member-state delegations to the WTO, as well
as theWTO Secretariat and key Chairs involved in negoti-
ating GATS 2000. As with most of the GATS-focused peti-
tions, the signatories were identified by name and coun-
try, and were framed as ‘civil society organizations from
around theworld’ (ARENA et al., 2005). In contrast, while
the 2003 ‘Evian’ petition was signed by an international
list of groups identified by their name and countries, it
was more narrowly focused on the EU’s GATS negotia-
tion position and demanded that it exclude water utili-
ties on the basis that it threatened ‘vulnerable commu-
nities worldwide’ (11.11.11 et al., 2003). This may have
reflected the fact that European groups utilized the anti-
GATS campaign to develop a trans-European network in-
tended to link the Seattle protests with the role of the
European Commission at the WTO. Suitably titled, the
S2B network effectively helped to share critical reports
between groups, provided a common voice of critique
addressed to EU Member States and the Commission’s
Directorate-General for Trade, and sometimes helped or-
ganize street protests (Strange, 2014).
The TTIP (s)ECI also adopted a more explicitly
‘European’ geographic frame that focused less on ei-
ther national autonomy or ‘global’ solidarity (see Table
1 for an overview). This was underpinned by three dy-
namics, each broadly corresponding to one of the di-
mensions of politicization discussed above. Firstly, the
anti-TTIP campaign largely took place in Europe. The
EU–US nature of the TTIP talks meant that contesta-
tion could have potentially been structured along a
transatlantic frame, as reflected in the list of signa-
tory groups to a December 2013 letter (which oper-
ated much like a GGP) demanding investor-state dis-
pute settlement (ISDS) be removed from the US–EU
discussions (350.org et al., 2013). Of 132 group sig-
natories, the majority were either EU- or US-based
(86 and 39 respectively). European/EU-based activists,
however, ultimately found more traction for their cam-
paign while US civil society groups focused their efforts
on campaigning against the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership were al-
ready more advanced and TTIP was perceived as less
of a threat given EU levels of labour or environmental
standards (Siles-Brügge, 2017, p. 472). In the EU, the
explicitly European, as opposed to transatlantic, fram-
ing of the sECI helped to not only underscore the cen-
trality of TTIP to targets’ lives, but was also culturally
and experientially resonant. It helped to draw out the
salience of transatlantic negotiations as a specific threat
to ‘European’ regulatory systems/standards—a key ele-
ment of the civil society campaign against TTIP (Eliasson
& Garcia-Duran, 2019, Ch. 4)—in what has been referred
to as ‘[m]ythmaking in European identity’ (Buonanno,
2017, p. 797).
Secondly, the European frame was also linked to the
decision to pursue an ECI—even after the Commission’s
rejection of the initial attempt at registration—despite
the additional constraints this imposed. Although the ECI
format featured stringent character limits (see European
Commission, 2019), organizers chose to maintain the
same short text for use within the signatory forms of the
sECI. Organizers also not only established a citizens’ com-
mittee, but also publicly touted the fact that they had
met Member State signature thresholds as prescribed in
the relevant EU rules governing ECIs (Efler et al., 2014;
McKeagney, 2015; Taylor, 2015). As Oleart and Bouza
(2018) have noted in a comparison of several ECIs, in-
cluding the one critical of TTIP (‘STOP TTIP’), organizers
must, whenwriting the petition text, have inmind both a
European audience of potential signatories as well as the
European decision-makers to whom the ECI is formally
addressed. The text of the STOP TTIP sECI thus presented
TTIP and CETA as a ‘threat to democracy and the rule of
law’ (Efler et al., 2014). It also repeated similar themes
seen in the anti-GATS petitions. Specifically, it sought
‘to prevent employment, social, environmental, privacy
and consumer standards from being lowered and public
services (such as water) and cultural assets from being
deregulated in non-transparent negotiations’ (Efler et al.,
2014). However, there was no mention of national au-
tonomy; instead organizers ‘support[ed] an alternative
trade and investment policy in the EU’ (Efler et al., 2014).
The framing thus put different types of European actors
and policies in opposition to each other within a single
public sphere (see also Oleart & Bouza, 2018), rather
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than polarizing national and supranational actors and lev-
els of political activity.
Thirdly, the transnational ‘European’ frame seen here
was not exclusively a product of the formal requirement
that ECIs be written to a trans-EU audience. A product
of a wider European ‘Stop TTIP Alliance,’ its creation
and, more importantly, the civil society activity that en-
sured its life after being rejected by the Commission,
was also closely linked to the support of the S2B net-
work (Gheyle, 2019, pp. 195–199; Oleart & Bouza, 2018,
pp. 879–880). Individuals named as its supporters, such
as Susan George or John Hilary, were embedded within
S2B. Its activists had sought to politicize EU trade nego-
tiations in the period between the GATS and TTIP, but
it was only with the launch of the TTIP talks in the
summer of 2013 that S2B’s efforts played a key role
in re-igniting the wider politicization of EU trade policy
(Siles-Brügge, 2017, pp. 470, 472–473). In collecting sig-
natures for the self-organized ECI, national groups such
as 11.11.11 in Belgium and Global Justice Now (formerly
World Development Movement) in the UK played similar
roles to theirwork during theGATS campaign.While there
may have been unevenness in the number of signatures
collectedby the STOPTTIP sECI acrossMember States, the
activity itself was nevertheless characterized by a transna-
tional/European frame and collaboration. The appeal to
a polysemic European frame served as a coalition mag-
net sustaining the expansion of civil society and other ac-
tors concernedwith TTIP (seeGheyle, 2019, pp. 195–199).
This is underscored by the fact that groups deliberately
chose the procedural constraints of an EU-level petition
even after its registration had been rejected.
4. Municipal-Level Trade Contestation: From the
Global to the Local
In addition to transnational petitions, both the anti-GATS
and anti-TTIP campaigns saw civil society groups turn to
‘municipal level trade contestation’ as a central device
to politicize the negotiations. Activists engaged in a se-
ries of concerted efforts to push local, and some regional,
governments into passing motions that were critical of
these agreements, often based on a template. Their
efforts saw local governments across largely Western
Europe pass many hundreds of motions over both cam-
paign periods (Siles-Brügge & Strange, in press). The con-
text for this campaigning wasmainly a national one, with
campaign groups affiliatedwith S2B often taking the lead
in producing the templates used by local campaigners.
As a result, the motions were often addressed to na-
tional policymakerswho could actwhere local politicians’
competences were seen to be circumscribed. In addition,
meetings involving both municipalities and campaign-
ers were organized over both campaign periods, with
several issuing summary ‘resolutions’ or ‘declarations.’
These reflected efforts at transnational collaboration—
to expand the number of actors active on the issue—
while also being directed more explicitly at policymak-
ers in the TTIP years. There was also a clear overlap be-
tween the national/supranational organizations involved
in the sECI/transnational group petitions and the munic-
ipal campaigning efforts, which bore the clear imprint
of S2B and the wider ‘Stop TTIP Alliance’ (see TTIP Free
Zones, 2019b).
The template resolutions we study here—from the
French and Austrian chapters of ATTAC—were focused
on rendering the distant concept of international trade
negotiations salient for local government representa-
tives and their citizens. They highlighted the possible ef-
fects these might have at the local (and national) level,
i.e., their ‘centrality’ to peoples’ lives (see Table 2 for
an overview of geographic frames and activist groups in-
volved). In the case of the anti-GATS campaign, suprana-
tional authority and/or rules were framed as a threat to
local and national government autonomy. Polarization
was thus also on a national-supranational axis. Thus, a
French ATTAC template resolution spoke of how ‘GATS
applies to all administrative levels, from the State to the
communes’ and of how international rules limited the
‘room for manoeuvre’ of local (government) representa-
tives (ATTAC-Rhône, 2005, p. 21, authors’ translation). In
the case of the Austrian GATS template, the threat to lo-
cal government service provision was said to come from
the intensification of EU competitiveness logics implied
by the GATS, although it did also emphasize more posi-
tive elements of the EU legal order, notably, the Charter
of Fundamental Rights. The resolution also underscored
the closeness of local government to citizens, in what
might be seen as an attempt to increase the commen-
surability with individuals’ lived experience (STOPP-GATS
Kampagne, 2004, pp. 78–79).
The geographic framing during the TTIP period was
different. The French national template on TTIP and CETA
highlighted how ‘ISDS would grant investors exclusive
rights to attack stateswhen democratic decisions—taken
by public institutions, including local authorities’ went
against their economic interests (Collectif Stop TAFTA,
n.d., p. 1, authors’ translation). It also rejected any at-
tempts at ‘weakening the national or European regula-
tory framework’ and the ‘erosion [of local government]
capacity to organize and regulate local sustainable de-
velopment in the general interest’ (Collectif Stop TAFTA,
n.d., p. 2, authors’ translation). Rather than seeing trade
agreements as reinforcing a negative EU political or-
der, as during the GATS period, the Austrian template
emphasized how they undermined the EU subsidiarity
principle by ‘constraining’ local decision-maker ‘auton-
omy’ (TTIP Stoppen, 2014, pp. 1–2, authors’ translation).
Trade agreements remained salient to the local level,
but the axis of polarization shifted. The core issue was
less the imposition of rules from supranational (global
and European) to national and local levels of decision-
making, but rather the constraints placed on democratic
decision-making bodies at several levels.
Beyond the more obvious call for a rejection of the
relevant trade agreements, the way in which the reso-
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Table 2. Geographic frames in municipal-level trade contestation.
Device Groups involved Framing strategy and politicization
GATS campaign
(2002–2006)
Municipal motions.
This article focuses
on the national
templates for:
• Austria
• France
ATTAC Austria
ATTAC France
Centrality and experiential
commensurability (to increase salience)
GATS is applicable to and constrains local
decision-making, which is close to
citizens.
Polysemy (to drive actor expansion)
Motions addressed to national
policymakers and speaking to questions
of process.
Defining the terms of polarization
GATS represents an imposition on local
and national governments by
international rules and the EU.
Transnational
declarations:
• Liège Resolution
• (2005)
• Geneva
• Declaration (2006)
Stated authors of the Liège
Resolution are European local
government representatives,
‘local, national, and
international’ trade unionists
and civil society organization
representatives (Convention
Européenne des Collectivités
Locales, 2005, p. 1, authors’
translation).
Stated authors of the Geneva
Resolution are European,
Canadian, and South African
local government
representatives, ‘local, national
and international’ trade
unionists and civil society
organization representatives
(Convention Internationale des
Collectivités Locales, 2006, p. 1,
authors’ translation).
Centrality and experiential
commensurability (to increase salience)
Relevance of GATS to the local level.
Polysemy (to drive actor expansion)
Link between local and global implications
of GATS, e.g., the Convention name shifts
from ‘European’ (Liège) to ‘Global’
(Geneva).
Defining the terms of polarization
The imposition of supranational rules on
‘international, national and local
legislation’ (Convention Européenne des
Collectivités Locales, 2005, p. 1, authors’
translation).
TTIP campaign
(2014–2017)
Municipal motions.
This article focuses
on the national
templates for:
• Austria
• France
ATTAC Austria
ATTAC France
Centrality and experiential
commensurability (to increase salience)
TTIP threatens local, national and
European regulation.
Polysemy (to drive actor expansion)
Motions addressed to national
policymakers and speaking to questions
of process.
Defining the terms of polarization
Supranational negotiations threaten
democratic decision-making at various
levels (local, national, European).
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Table 2. (Cont.) Geographic frames in municipal-level trade contestation.
Device Groups involved Framing strategy and politicization
TTIP campaign
(2014–2017)
Transnational
declarations:
• Barcelona (2016)
• Grenoble (2017)
TTIP Free Zones Europe, with
links to Seattle-to-Brussels and
the wider ‘Stop TTIP Alliance.’
Centrality, cultural resonance and
experiential commensurability (to
increase salience)
TTIP undermines European regulatory
standards.
Polysemy (to drive actor expansion)
European focus: signatories of
declarations are European municipalities
only. Focus on European-level debate.
Defining the terms of polarization
The local inhabits a European public
sphere: TTIP as a threat to European
values.
Sources: ATTAC-Rhône (2005), Collectif Stop TAFTA (n.d.), Convention Européenne des Collectivités Locales (2005, 2006), Pan-European
Meeting of Local Authorities (2016), Pan-European Meeting of TTIP-free zones (2017), STOPP-GATS Kampagne (2004), TTIP Free Zones
(2019a, 2019b), TTIP Stoppen (2014).
lutions framed the negotiating process and their target
audience underscored the nationally-based campaign-
ing context for these resolutions, which sought to en-
courage an expansion in the range of domestic actors
taking issue with the GATS. A focus on questions of
process was also more ambiguous than statements on
content. Both French and Austrian sample resolutions
highlighted the lack of transparency in the GATS/TTIP
negotiations. The French motions also emphasized the
non-involvement of local governments specifically and
demanded ‘the opening of a national debate’ on the
GATS/TTIP (ATTAC-Rhône, 2005, p. 21; Collectif Stop
TAFTA, n.d., pp. 1–2). Meanwhile, the Austrian motions
were predominantly directed at national and regional
policymakers; the only exception was a reference to
Members of the European Parliament in the TTIP sam-
ple motion (STOPP-GATS Kampagne, 2004, p. 78; TTIP
Stoppen, 2014, p. 1).
In contrast, the declarations and resolutions issued at
international meetings of municipalities sought to more
explicitly link local campaigning and trade policy impacts,
which had the greatest immediate centrality and ex-
periential commensurability, to transnational problems
and activism in an effort to act as a coalition magnet.
That said, the nature of transnational solidarity being
articulated through polysemic geographic frames varied
across both campaign periods, mirroring the shift in dis-
course between the GATS-related GGPs and the TTIP
sECI. The declarations/resolutions to come out of the
‘European/International Convention for the Promotion
of Public Services’ (for theGATS period) and the ‘Meeting
of Local Authorities/TTIP Free Zones’ (for the TTIP period)
saw a shift from relying on a greater mix of geographic
frames to focusing much more explicitly on the link be-
tween the local and the European level (see Table 2 for
an overview).
It is not unreasonable to see this as partly reflect-
ing the changed subject matter (global versus transat-
lantic negotiations), and the desire in the GATS period
to appeal beyond (Western) Europe, which saw the vast
majority of anti-GATS motions (Siles-Brügge & Strange,
in press). The initial Liège Resolution was authored by
‘elected representatives from several European coun-
tries’; ‘trade unionists’ from the ‘local, national and
international’ levels and members of civil society or-
ganizations concerned with global issues (Convention
Européenne des Collectivités Locales, 2005, p. 1, authors’
translation). Authorship of the Geneva Declaration,
however, was additionally attributed to local govern-
ment representatives from Canada and South Africa
(Convention Internationale des Collectivités Locales,
2006, p. 1), with the Convention going frombeing framed
as ‘European’ to ‘Global.’ However, authorship of the
Barcelona and Grenoble Declarations was narrower than
the transatlantic scope of the talks. Only Europeanmunic-
ipalitieswere listed as signatories—despite the presence
and role of social movement organizations in coordinat-
ing the pan-European campaign and meeting (see TTIP
Free Zones, 2019b)—and the broader TTIP Free Zones
campaign itself was explicitly European in scope (TTIP
Free Zones, 2019a). The Barcelona Declaration, however,
did ‘celebrate the social movement which has made [a]
European debate possible’ (Pan-European Meeting of
Local Authorities, 2016, p. 2).
As for the national templates, the move from the
GATS to the TTIP period also saw the frame around the
restriction of national and local autonomy shift away
from emphasizing the imposition of supranational rules.
In other words, polarization on the issue was no longer
simply defined in terms of an opposition between na-
tional and supranational actors and policies, but rather
in terms of actors inhabiting the same European public
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sphere/level (see Oleart & Bouza, 2018). The Liège res-
olution emphasized the risks of WTO-imposed (public)
services liberalization for ‘international, national and lo-
cal legislation,’ while also highlighting how EU and na-
tional policies endangered public services (Convention
Européenne des Collectivités Locales, 2005, p. 1, au-
thors’ translation). The Geneva Declaration, meanwhile,
similarly stressed the problems associated with the
global marketization of public services driven by the
WTO, in partnership with the European Commission,
with national governments showing ‘zeal’ in ‘accept[ing]
and put[ting] into practice’ this agenda (Convention
Internationale des Collectivités Locales, 2006, p. 1, au-
thors’ translation). In contrast, the central diagnostic in
the Barcelona Declaration was that at a time of EU crises,
‘new generation trade agreements’ (TTIP, CETA, TiSA) un-
dermined the ‘core’ values that the European project
should be guided by (‘solidarity, respect of freedoms and
justice’) and instead ‘put at risk [local authorities’] ca-
pacity to legislate and use public funds’ (Pan-European
Meeting of Local Authorities, 2016, p. 1). The ‘treaties
[were] being negotiated in a non-transparent manner,
not fulfilling European democratic and participatory stan-
dards’ (Pan-EuropeanMeeting of Local Authorities, 2016,
p. 1). The Grenoble Declaration of February 2017 was
very similar in its focus on a European problématique. At
a time of EU crisis, ‘new-general free-trade agreements’
undermine ‘fundamental values’ that should be at the
heart of European initiatives to ‘reinforc[e] social, eco-
nomic, environmental and labour rights.’ Notably, the
Declaration emphasized that ‘[o]nly rebuilding democ-
racy and reinventing the relationship with citizens can
fight the rise of nationalist and xenophobic ideas,’ al-
luding to the ‘[t]housands of initiatives…already set in
motion…in cities and regions’ (Pan-European meeting of
TTIP-free zones, 2017). Rejecting economic nationalism
went hand in hand with accentuating the links between
the local/regional and the European.
Coupled with the shift in authorship, the reconfigu-
ration of geographic frames might also be explained by
the fact that these latter declarations were not only part
of an explicitly European campaign (‘TTIP Free zones’),
but were also presented as statements from ‘governmen-
tal’ authorities to decision-makers in the EU, national
governments and other relevant institutions. Explicitly
invoking ‘European’ values may have served a dual pur-
pose here. For one, it reflected a reliance on a strategy
of what has been called ‘mimetic challenge,’ whereby
weaker actors are empowered to challenge authority by
adopting techniques and styles such that they neverthe-
less appear as if conforming (Seabrooke & Hobson, 2007,
p. 16; Siles-Brügge & Strange, in press). Moreover, and
as for the (s)ECI, the focus on the European level, as op-
posed to transatlantic solidarity, allowed the TTIP/CETA-
related declarations to emphasize the specific concerns
civil society groups were raising about ‘European’ regula-
tory standards, such as the weight attached to the poten-
tial dilution of precautionary risk regulation. Such fram-
ing not only accentuated the centrality and experiential
commensurability of the issue, but was also culturally
resonant. Finally, the Grenoble Declaration emerged in a
context where opponents of the EU’s trade agenda were
increasingly tarred with the brush of being economic na-
tionalists after the votes for Brexit and Donald Trump.
Differentiating their position became a more pressing
concern for European civil society groups campaigning
on trade issues (Siles-Brügge, 2017).
5. Conclusion
Our central argument in this article has been that the
politicization of trade negotiations is not just about a pro-
sovereignty backlash in the face of the supranational ex-
ercise of authority. The collective action frames that civil
society actors rely on to politicize trade negotiations of-
ten emphasize multiple geographies as a means of tar-
geting different authoritative actors, as well as commu-
nicating to various supportive audiences.
In both the GATS and TTIP cases, the wider public
was commonly addressed via national campaigns, with
trade negotiations often framed as a threat to (national)
‘government autonomy’ as a means of drawing out the
salience of the issue. While such frames appeared in the
transnational petitions we studied for the GATS period,
it was most explicit in the case of municipal level trade
contestation, where sample motions focused specifically
on the risks of trade agreements for the autonomy of lo-
cal governments. This made sense as a tactic to politicize
local government and citizens—helping to polarize the is-
sue. The focus on the local impacts of trade agreements
allowed activists to highlight the centrality and experien-
tial commensurability of trade policy without as much
emphasis on national sovereignty. Moreover, in both the
petitions and the municipal level activism, the demand
for ‘national/local autonomy’ wasmade in the context of
frames calling for ‘transnational solidarity,’ which served
as polysemic coalition magnets (actor expansion). Both
moments of politicization were dominated by European
actors, with much of the group-to-group relations within
civil society channelled through the trans-European S2B
network. As evident in the various GGPs that served to
articulate and develop the S2B network, activists con-
sciously chose to combine identification by group and
nationality, on one side, with transnational solidaric de-
mands. The resolutions issued by transnational group-
ings of municipalities in the GATS period also combined
such mixed geographic frames.
During the GATS talks, transnational solidaric de-
mands weremore global in their reach, in part due to the
more encompassing nature of the respective trade nego-
tiations, with a claim that the proposed agreement was a
particular threat to developing countries. Despite being a
transatlantic negotiation with potential repercussions for
other parts of the globe, the TTIP campaign narrowed to
focus on the European scene. With US domestic politics
focused on the Trans-Pacific Partnership and difficulties
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in presenting EU rules as a threat to US consumer and
labour rights, the EU and its Member States provided a
richer ground for activists to contest TTIP in culturally and
experientially resonant terms, drawing out the salience of
the talks as a threat to ‘European standards.’ The ECI was
also in part responsible for the more ‘European’ frame
of the TTIP campaign, with activists choosing to ‘self-
organize’ and collect signatures for their own sECI after
being initially rejected registration by the Commission.
The ensuing ‘European’ framing of the petitionwas there-
fore quite deliberate and illustrative of efforts to sustain
transnational solidarity and expand activism. Choosing to
maintain the text and criteria for the formal ECI, activists
presented an alternative vision of European integration
to that driven by the Commission. The same can be said
of the transnational declarations issued by municipalities
in the TTIP period, which later also explicitly sought to dif-
ferentiate their criticism of ‘new generation trade agree-
ments’ from economic populism. Local government mo-
tions prepared by activists in this period also put less em-
phasis than before on the imposition of supranational
rules: Political polarization took place within a European
public sphere (see also Oleart & Bouza, 2018).
Understanding that geographic frames are not just
descriptive of ‘movements’ or NGO demands but, rather,
key drivers themselves of politicization, is important to
how we study the formation and mobilization of civil so-
ciety networks. With specific regard to the politicization
of trade policy, we need to be careful not to dismiss it as a
simple ‘nationalist backlash,’ but instead examine where
activist demands are also supportive of transnational co-
operation. Our finding thus challenges the ‘transfer of
authority’ thesis widely found in the politicization liter-
ature. It invites us to think about the specific critiques
of trade agreements articulated by civil society activists,
which may be supportive of certain kinds of suprana-
tional policymaking—as the authors of the Barcelona
and Grenoble Declarations in particular have been at
pains to stress. In practice, critics of trade negotiations
may therefore well have much more in common with
trade negotiators than either side acknowledge. Claims
such activists are ‘protectionist’ or ‘anti-globalist’ create
false binaries that unnecessarily obfuscate the political
issues at hand.
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